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Politics, War and Diplomacy in late fifteenth-
century Italy: Machiavellian thoughts and
Venetian examples
by Humfrey Butters
In the course of the last century political, military and diplomatic history
gradually lost their age-old supremacy, as other forms of history, social,
economic and cultural, came to play an increasingly prominent role.
Paradoxically, in the same period, Political Science and International
Relations, conceived of as subjects belonging to the social sciences, grew and
prospered. In the discipline of International Relations two of the foremost
schools, the Realists and the Behaviouralists, were wedded to positivism, the
view that the social sciences should adopt the same methodology as the natural
sciences1. There are two reasons why these not particularly novel reflections on
twentieth-century intellectual developments are relevant to a historical essay
on Italian political life in the late fifteenth century. The first is that one of the
fundamental early texts of the Realist school was written not by a social
scientist, but by a historian with strong Marxist and positivist leanings. The
work was The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939 and its author was E. H. Carr.
The second is that Carr took Machiavelli, whose works are full of reflections
upon fifteenth and early sixteenth-century Italian history, to be the model
exponent, avant la lettre, of Realism.
Carr cast Machiavelli in this star role because of three principles that,
according to him, underlay the latter’s works: that the task of the political or
social theorist is to lay bare the sequences of cause and effect of which history
is composed; that practice is prior to and produces theory; and that morality
is the fruit of power2. It is not difficult to see Marxist inspiration in Carr’s
interpretation of Machiavelli, for Marx certainly shared Machiavelli’s contempt
for certain sorts of idealistic or utopian thinking, while being, like Machiavelli,
quite willing to indulge in his own variety of it. There are, however, several
reasons for doubting that Machiavelli deserves a place in the Realist pantheon,
and one very good one is that it is impossible to combine Machiavelli’s
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conception of the importance of Fortuna with a positivist belief in universal
causal laws, as Montesquieu, a keen student of Machiavelli’s oeuvre, was
perfectly aware3. Whatever one thinks about Machiavelli’s views on Fortune,
it is fairly clear that the social sciences have failed so far to produce the causal
laws that would enable them to explain and predict the phenomena that
constitute their respective subject matters4. 
Another reason for doubting whether Machiavelli can be accounted an early
member of the Realist school is that while Realists tend to make a sharp
distinction between domestic politics and the conduct of relations between
states, he did not. In The Prince he stressed how important it was for a prince
both to win a good reputation at home, by keeping his subjects satisfied and by
avoiding their hatred or contempt, and to have the formidable military resources
and reliable allies that would secure him from foreign threats. A ruler’s domestic
reputation for strong and effective government would make it less likely that
foreign powers would attack him; while a successful foreign policy would help
to discourage his domestic opponents from engaging in rebellion or other sorts
of disobedience5. Machiavelli’s perception of the intermeshing of politics, war
and diplomacy is also to be seen in his account of Rome’s career of conquest in
the Discourses. Machiavelli is rightly notorious for his insistence upon the role
of force in government, but it would be a grave error to suppose that he thought
that power and force were identical, or that Rome’s enormous territorial
acquisitions were to be attributed solely to the use of her formidable military
apparatus. He also considered that the perceptions or estimates of Rome’s
military potential of those facing Roman expansion or, to put it another way,
Rome’s reputation, were of great significance. Rome, according to him, was
fortunate in that its foes did not unite to oppose her, because when one state was
attacked others were too scared to come to its assistance. In the case of states
geographically distant from Rome, such as Carthage, Machiavelli saw the former
as the beneficiary of their miscalculations: the Carthaginians, for example,
whenever Rome was engaging one of her opponents, judged that she would be
defeated; and when that judgment turned out to be wrong, they supposed that
they would be still be able to deal with the threat Rome posed by military or
peaceful means. Another crucial factor in Rome’s victories was her ability to
secure the assistance of allies, or compagni; and in some cases these allies were
dissident elements within the state that Rome was attacking, fifth columns
ready to assist her in countries such as Greece, Spain or Gaul6. The significance
that Machiavelli attached to reputation comes out clearly in The Prince, where
despite the stress that he lays there upon robust military arrangements, he
argues that the rulers of Western Europe could not rule by force alone, for in
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their dominions the people were stronger than the army. It was for that reason
that a canny ruler was well advised, according to Machiavelli, to take seriously
both what his subjects wanted him to do and their estimates of how likely it was
that he would be able to provide it7.
In the forty years leading up to the French invasion of 1494 the relations
between the principal Italian powers provide numerous examples to support
Machiavelli’s view that political life on the one hand, war and diplomacy on the
other were hopelessly embrangled. It is true that a powerful historiographical
tradition, deriving ultimately from Burckhardt’s vision of the Renaissance
State, has argued that in this period Venice, Milan, the Papacy, the kingdom
of Naples and Florence, whose governments exercised tight control over the
territories subject to them, were engaged in a rather orderly competition in
which no one power dominated the rest, so that it is legitimate to speak of the
operation of a balance of power8. The principal problem with this opinion is
that while it is perfectly true that in the late Middle Ages Italian political
geography was simplified by the emergence of the five powers in question,
which almost without exception acquired resources that they had not had
before, such as standing armies9 and resident ambassadors10, it is not clear
that their internal organization corresponded very closely to that depicted by
Burckhardt or his later followers. The cities that became subject to Florence
and Venice, for example, in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries,
retained many of their previous statutes, institutions and leading families.
Feudal jurisdiction, moreover, can be found almost everywhere, in the
kingdom of Naples, the duchy of Milan, the Papal State and the Venetian
Terraferma state11. This is why one of the principal tasks of Italian governments
in this period was to manage their aristocracies, using patronage, force, or the
threat of force, as occasion demanded, and by no means all of them showed
themselves capable of this. One of the reasons why success could prove elusive
was that the resources upon which the domestic opponents of a government
could draw were not confined within the frontiers of the territories subject to
it. In Genoa governments were often overthrown or threatened by an alliance
between a hostile faction and a foreign power such as France or Milan; while
in Naples the Aragonese monarchy faced two serious baronial rebellions,
between 1458 and 1462 and from 1485 to 1486, the former backed by the house
of Anjou, the latter by the Papacy12. Governments, therefore, did not
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necessarily have a monopoly of foreign policy; but they could certainly seek to
forestall such crises, or overcome them when they arose, with the aid of their
own external allies, and the classic case of this is the relationship with Milan
that for several decades buttressed the Medici regime in Florence.
This is not the only respect, moreover, in which domestic politics and
foreign affairs could be difficult to disentangle: the Barons’ War of 1485-1486
provides two further ones. Firstly, its status was ambiguous, since although it
could be regarded as a war between two of the major powers of Italy, and so
as an episode in Neapolitan or Papal foreign policy, the Papacy had a long-
standing claim to be the feudal overlord of the king of Naples and, therefore,
to have the right to intervene in the conflict between Ferrante and the rebel
barons. Secondly, some of the leading actors in the drama had lands both in
the Papal State and in the Regno, such as the Orsini and the Colonna families13.
Another reason for doubting the idea that there was a balance of power in
operation in this period is provided by the outcome of the Ferrara war (1482-
1484), in the latter stages of which Venice confronted the other four major
powers and still contrived to come out with a significant gain, the Polesine of
Rovigo14. What is certainly true is that, thanks to Venice’s extraordinary
territorial expansion in the first half of the fifteenth century, the Peace of Lodi
(1454) and the alliance between Milan and Florence were both motivated in
large part by the desire to limit Venetian ambitions15. It is not surprising that
it became a commonplace in the second half of the century to accuse Venice of
seeking the imperio d’Italia16; and although it is not certain how many of those
who levelled this charge actually believed it, Venetians themselves were quite
happy to compare themselves to the Romans17.
Machiavelli did not share this latter view, but he did have a sufficiently
high opinion of Venice’s importance to think that it was worthwhile to compare
Venice with Rome, even though his purpose in making such a comparison was
to draw attention to the differences between them. His principal reason for
having a lower opinion of Venice than of Rome was that he found Venetian
military institutions decidedly inferior to Roman ones, thanks to Venice’s
reliance upon condottieri, whose deployment Machiavelli took to be an
infallible sign of corruption. He attributed Venetian territorial expansion to
cunning and cash rather than military prowess18, taking his distaste for
Venetian military arrangements to the point of maintaining that Venice was
stronger before she acquired her mainland territories19. The disintegration of
Venice’s Terraferma state after the battle of Agnadello in 1509 was obviously
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in his mind, and the fact that she was able in the following years to recover
most of what she had lost did not alter his judgment20. What he did concede
was that Venice had survived for a longer period as a republic than Rome had,
and for that reason he argued that a republic that wanted to expand should
follow the Roman model, but a republic that was content merely to survive
would be better advised to follow the Venetian one21. He failed to grasp the
significance of the development of standing armies in Italy, so that the fact
that Venice had one failed to impress him22.
Venice had other profoundly significant resources. The wealth that she
derived from her crucial role in the spice trade gave her a great advantage, and
so did her fleet and her geographical location. In the late fifteenth century the
annual income of the Venetian government in normal years (admittedly a
rather artificial notion) of 1,150,000 ducats was almost certainly superior to
that of her main Italian rivals23; though it is worth pointing out that Machiavelli
would not have been impressed by this latter fact, because he was very keen to
deny that money was essential to the successful waging of war24. The subject
of the relationship of resources to foreign policy is, however, not a simple one.
The choices governments made were obviously dependent on the resources
available to them; but these did not constitute a fixed and predictable quantity,
for the human and material resources available for one political or military
undertaking would not necessarily be available for another. This was
particularly true of those represented by a government’s foreign friends and
allies,of whose great value Machiavelli was quite aware25. 
Nor was there a simple relationship between a government’s domestic
resources, military and financial, and the outcome of the conflicts in which it
engaged. The war of Ferrara (1482-1484) presents a particularly good example
of this. Although it is true that the income of the Venetian state was probably
superior to that of any one of the five powers that it confronted in the closing
stages of the war, Ferrara, Milan, Naples, Florence and the Papacy, it was
certainly not superior to their combined incomes, though naturally much
depended in times of war on the sources of credit on which each could draw.
The number of troops at its disposal, however, around 20,000, was probably
not even superior to that which Milan alone could deploy, and it was, without
a shadow of a doubt, inferior to that of the armed forces of the five put together.
But as we have seen, the result of the war was not what these considerations
might have led one to expect, for Venice emerged from the war with a
substantial gain26. Timing, tactics and strategy, the quality of the troops and of
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their commanders all played a crucial role, but so did that elusive factor,
reputazione, to which Machiavelli paid so much attention. His discussion of it
in The Prince and the Discourses, was notably original, but the perception that
statesmen needed to take account of it was hardly a new one: king Ferrante of
Naples, for example, a cunning but hardly a very deep thinker, told the
Florentine and Milanese ambassadors on one occasion that the survival of
regimes was as much a matter of their reputation as of their military
resources27.
It would not be particularly daring to conclude that this was a view
common to all the leading players in the game of Italian politics in the late
fifteenth century; and if it was, it amounted to an admission by them that their
task, to defend the interests of the states that they governed, was an extremely
complex one. One quality it required was the ability to predict who was likely
to emerge as a winner in a particular contest, however winning was defined at
each stage of the unceasing military and diplomatic struggle that constituted
Italian political life; and the part played by reputazione in that struggle made
the business of prediction very difficult, so difficult indeed that there is a
certain analogy, not to be pressed too far, between the rivalries of Italy’s states
and Keynes’s famous description of the economy, which he compared to a
contest to forecast the result of a beauty competition, in which each contestant
has to choose not the most beautiful candidate, but the one most likely to win
the votes of the other contestants. As Keynes puts it: “It is not a case of choosing
those which, to the best of one’s judgement, really are the prettiest, nor even
those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached
the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average
opinion expects average opinion to be”28. This does not mean, of course, that
Italian political life was so opaque that one calculation was just as good as any
other. Only a very stupid Italian statesman would have spent much time trying
to work out whether Poggibonsi’s resources were superior or inferior to those
of Venice; but, equally, only a very stupid one would have illuded himself that
he knew exactly what, at any given moment, Venice’s resources actually were,
for, in a world in which duplicity and the management of impressions played
such a leading role, and in which unpredictable events were commonplace,
this was a form of knowledge that not even Venetian statesmen possessed.
These features of political and diplomatic life are not, of course, confined to late
fifteenth-century Italy. When Harold Macmillan was asked what preoccupied
him most when he was Prime Minister, he replied: “Events, dear boy, events.”
Both Niccolò Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini would have had
considerable sympathy for this point of view.
One key element in Venice’s military arrangements illustrates particularly well
the point that resources were dependent upon policies: the city’s heavy reliance on
the services of condottieri. It is true that her experience of the use of' mercenaries
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was far happier than Florence’s29, and in most respects bore little relationship to
Machiavelli’s atrabilious verdicts upon it. This was because Venice made every
effort to induce her condottieri to identify their interests with hers, with grants of
estates, pensions and even honorary citizenship30. But frequently one of the city’s
condottieri showed that he had political and military aims that diverged quite
markedly from those of his employer, and in those circumstances Machiavelli’s
critique of the condottieri system had more purchase. A good example of this
phenomenon was Roberto di Sanseverino, Venice’s principal condottiere for most
of the 1480’s. During the Ferrara war he was involved in clandestine dealings with
the Ghibelline faction in Milan, and while this could be seen as an entirely
reasonable discharge of his duties by a sedulous servant of a major power, since a
standard tactic in the Italian wars of the age – one already deployed by the Romans,
as Machiavelli pointed out31 – was the subversion of one’s enemies from within by
the establishment of fifth columns, it is not clear that in this case Sanseverino’s
political activities were solely concerned to benefit his employer. He had for long
been involved in Milanese political life, indeed, he had been born into it, because
his mother Elisa was the sister of Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan32. 
Since his father Leonetto was the illegitimate son of Bertrando di
Sanseverino, count of Caiazzo33, Roberto also belonged to one of the leading
families of the Regno, and thus furnishes a further example of how complicated
the political interests of Italian nobles could be. In 1477 duchess Bona made him
one of the members of a new formed section of the Consiglio segreto that had a
permanent residence in the Castello34; but this did not prevent him from
harbouring his own considerable ambitions, which according to one report
extended to the conquest of Parma, Piacenza, Pavia and even Milan itself35. In
May 1477 he was found guilty of conspiring against the Duchess’s regime,
together with several members of the Sforza family, including Ludovico, and
declared a rebel36. His estates in the duchy were confiscated. Two years later the
support that he and Ludovico enjoyed within the Milanese state brought about
their return to favour37 and the eventual removal from power of the Duchess.
His alliance with Ludovico was not, however, destined to enjoy a long life. By
January 1482 he had become convinced that Ludovico was aiming to exclude
him from his role in government, and he feared, moreover, that if he set foot in
Milan, he would be arrested38. Sanseverino’s solution to his predicament was to
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seek employment with Venice, where on 29 March 1482 more than four hundred
nobles turned out to welcome him39.
After the end of the Ferrara war in the summer of 1484 Ludovico sought to
re-establish good relations with Sanseverino, partly in order to draw closer to
Venice, but this made the Ghibelline faction in Milan very nervous, for some of
them had engaged in clandestine dealings with the condottiere during the war.
Led by Filippo degli Eustachii, the castellan of Milan, they made Ludovico
abandon his attempt to court Sanseverino, who was declared a rebel once again
in July 1485 for conspiring against him40. In the Barons’ War Venice maintained
a neutral posture, but it did allow Sanseverino to join his troops to those of the
Pope and the rebel barons. His justification for taking this step was that his sole
source of income at that point was his condotta with Venice, which was
inadequate to his needs. He claimed that he had taken legal advice before
signing his condotta with the Pope. The Venetian government informed Milan
that it had protested at the condottiere’s decision, but seeing that it would be
impossible to make him change his mind, it had decided to let him go41.
What was Venice doing in granting Sanseverino the permission that he
sought? Bernardo Rucellai, Florentine ambassador in Milan, considered that
the Venetian government wanted the condottiere to join the Pope, even if it
had not been able to convince the Senate to give him leave to do so. On the
other hand it is not obvious that the Venetian government could have stopped
him. On 22 December 1485 Giovanni Lanfredini, Florentine ambassador in
Naples, in a summary of the forces deployed on both sides of the conflict,
calculated that Sanseverino had six hundred men-at-arms with him42. The
Venetian government would have run the risk of a more serious loss of face if
it had persisted in its refusal to give him permission to go and he had simply
ignored this. 
In the decade between the end of the Ferrara war and the French invasion
of 1494 there is a striking, indeed an ironic contrast between Venetian foreign
policy and the views of those Italian rivals of hers who saw, or claimed to see,
the city as bent on the domination of Italy, or of those Venetians given to
remarking upon the similarities between Venice and ancient Rome. The only
conflict in which she was involved was the short-lived war of Rovereto of 1487
with the count of Tyrol, in which a key issue was the extensive acquisition and
exploitation by Venetian patricians of mines located in areas adjoining Venice’s
frontiers with the bishoprics of Bressanone and Trento and the lands of the
Count43. The defence of her Terraferma dominions and of those that
constituted the Stato da mar was just as important to Venice as it had always
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been, but no threats to these significant enough to elicit from Venice a massive
and sustained response emerged in these years; nor was the government
tempted to engage in any aggressive ventures in order to increase the amount
of territory under its control. There were sound financial reasons for such a
stance. The Ferrara war was reputed to have cost more than two million
ducats44, and in order to be able to engage in it the government had been forced
to transform existing public credit arrangements by the establishment of the
Monte Nuovo in 1482. The Monte Vecchio, it was thought, would not have
been able to confront the challenge, since already by the 1470’s its payments
of interest were twenty years in arrears45. 
The Ferrara war was the most extensive military enterprise undertaken by
Venice on the Italian mainland between 1454 and 1494, and the one that
provides the best evidence for those observers, contemporaries or modern
historians, who ascribed to the city the goal of dominating Italy. But while it
is plausible to suppose that the Venetians hoped to overwhelm Ferrara’s
defences before the forces of Ercole d’Este’s allies could arrive on the scene, it
is far from clear that Venice intended to absorb the city and all its territories
into her Terraferma state, even though the Papacy had made this formally
possible by bestowing the vicariate of Ferrara on her in April 1482. There is
much to be said for Mallett’s verdict that Venetian war aims were probably far
more modest: the full observance by the Ferrarese of the patti that had for
long regulated commercial relations between the two cities, greatly to the
advantage of Venice, and the recovery of the Polesine of Rovigo46. It is
significant, moreover, that many leading Venetian statesmen were for long
reluctant to contemplate war with Ferrara. As late as November 1481 the Doge
and a majority of the Collegio were still insisting that the construction of three
forts intended to prevent incursions across the frontier should be delayed, in
order to allow further negotiations to take place; and towards the end of that
month seventy senators voted against a proposal to send Ercole d’Este an
ultimatum47. It could be argued that Venice’s ability to emerge from this major
conflict having achieved most of its war aims, even though it had had to
confront four of the major powers in Italy and one of medium rank, showed
that the Roman dreams dreamt by some Venetians were not mere flights of
fantasy; but while Venice’s success was undoubtedly due in part to its ability
to deploy formidable military and financial resources, the outcome of the war
owed much to the divisions among her opponents and to the fact that their
other commitments prevented them from dedicating themselves single-
mindedly to the defeat of Venice48. If, moreover, the favourable result Venice
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obtained had emboldened some Venetians to entertain further expansionist
ambitions, there is little sign of it in the decade that followed the end of the war.
One reason why Venetian foreign policy in Italy tended to be more cautious
in the second half of the century than it had been in the first, was that the city’s
governors were more preoccupied than before with the Ottoman menace, as a
consequence of the capture of Constantinople in 1453 and the conquest of the
Morea, completed in 1460. In 1463, after a vigorous debate in the Senate, which
showed that even in these circumstances there was a strong peace party in
Venice, she went to war with the Ottomans, a conflict that lasted until 1479, and
resulted in the loss of Negroponte, a disaster which, according to the chronicler
Domenico Malipiero, terrified the Venetian ruling élite49. When in the middle
of this undertaking Venice provided assistance to her condottiere Bartolomeo
Colleoni in his failed attempt to topple the Medici regime in Florence (1466-
1468), she was forced to face the fact that it was very difficult for her to conduct
a successful war on two fronts50.
Even if Venice’s foreign policy in the decade before the start of the Italian
wars was relatively lacking in bold initiatives, the importance attributed to the
city by the other major powers continued to be considerable. In the early part
of 1486, for example, Pope Innocent VIII made a serious effort to convince the
Venetian government to ally with the rebel barons against the king of Naples,
but although the government made him an offer, it was one that it must have
known he would have to refuse: the Pope would receive thirty squadre and 2-
3,000 foot, and in return he would concede to Venice a string of Romagna
towns including Cesena and Savignano.Unsurprisingly Innocent declined the
offer, declaring that he had no intention of diminishing the Papal States51. This
disappointment did not, however, discourage the Pope, in the year following
the end of the Barons’ War, from contracting an alliance with Venice52.
Ludovico Sforza was another ruler extremely anxious to be on good terms
with Venice after the Ferrara war, in part because he had experienced her
ability to exploit divisions within the political élite of the Milanese state. One
of Venice’s strengths in its dealings with other Italian states was that it was
less vulnerable to this sort of exploitation, since although it was hardly free of
factional conflicts, these were not so grave as to produce the sorts of violent
upheavals that were a regular feature of political life in Genoa and the Papal
States, and an occasional one in the Regno, Florence or the duchy of Milan. In
August 1486, however, a major clash over the dogeship broke out between the
Longhi and Curti families, becoming so serious that elections to the Senate
and the Council of Ten became a battleground between the two parties53. Marin
Sanudo commented that the whole city was divided by the conflict, which came
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to the ears of Ludovico Sforza. He took the matter so seriously that he delivered
the following warning to the Venetian ambassador, Marcantonio Morosini:
“Hora vedo ben quel Stado in desolation et im partialità esser venuto, fareti far
novi pensieri d’ i fati vostri a i Signori de Italia.” Morosini’s dispatch, in which
he reported Sforza’s words, was read in the Council of Ten, and it was decided
that the Doge should deliver a speech to the Great Council, exhorting them to
abandon their dissensions for the sake of civic concord54. Ludovico must have
taken some pleasure in being able to lecture the Venetians about the loss of
reputation that a state infected with serious domestic dissensions was likely to
incur, but the danger to which he adverted was real enough.
Ludovico’s determination to cultivate the Venetians after the Ferrara war
put a considerable strain on his relationship with a longstanding ally of Milan’s,
Florence. In a letter to his master of 20 November 1486 the Ferrarese
ambassador wrote that Lorenzo de’ Medici had complained bitterly about
Milan’s behaviour, commenting, according to the ambassador: “Et che hora
mai il non sapea più che dire se non che ’l cognosea la maiore difficultà essere
in governarse cum li amici che diffenderse da li inimici”55. But Lorenzo himself
was perfectly aware of the advantages, temporary or otherwise, of appearing
to be associated with Venice. It was for this reason that in 1487 he had
constantly encouraged the Pope, with whom he was seeking to build a solid
relationship, to reinforce his alliance with that city56. He also used his political
influence in the same year to secure the dispatch of a Florentine ambassador
to Venice, an initiative intended to punish Ludovico Sforza for his failure to
back Florence in its struggle with Genoa over Sarzana57, and for his excessively
deferential attitude towards Venice58. These examples provide telling
illustrations of the fact that in the second half of the fifteenth century Venice
did not need to embark upon dramatic or aggressive adventures on the Italian
mainland in order to persuade the other major states of the peninsula that she
was a power to be feared and, when necessary, cultivated.
151
Politics, War and Diplomacy in late fifteenth-century Italy
54 Sanudo, 536.
55 Lorenzo de’ Medici, 2003, 25-26n14: Aldobrandino Guidoni to Ercole d’Este, 20 November
1486. 
56 Ibid., 359n10.
57 Ibid., 257n1.
58 Ibid., 383n10.
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Abstract
The essay discusses theoretical and practical aspects of politics, war and diplomacy in late
fifteenth-century Italy, using Machiavelli’s works as an example of theory, Venetian foreign policy
as an example of practice. The attempt to present Machiavelli as a founding father of the Realist
school of International Relations is considered and dismissed. Major features of Machiavelli’s
thought are treated: his vision of the intimate connections between foreign affairs, war and political
life; his distinguishing power from force; and his grasp of the importance of reputation. The value
of these as a guide to the politics of Italy between 1454 and 1494 is assessed, with particular
reference to Venice, and to the merits and defects of Machiavelli’s famous comparison between
ancient Rome and Venice. The career of Roberto di Sanseverino is examined to show that one
premise upon which that comparison was based, that condottieri were unreliable, was sometimes
well founded.
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